Sequential auction and auction design

Often an auction designer has the option of selling, or purchasing, those lots available in one auction or a sequence of auctions. In addition, bidder opportunities will not be static, in part due to arrival of information, but also because bidders can face deadlines for making decisions. This paper examines the optimal decision about how to divide what is available over time.

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Year of publication:	2010-11-04
Authors:	salant, david j

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Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	salant, david j (2010): Sequential auction and auction design.
Classification:	L51 - Economics of Regulation ; D44 - Auctions ; C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games
Source:	BASE

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015226409