Sequential bargaining with pure common values and incomplete information on both sides

We study the alternating-offer bargaining problem of sharing a common value pie under incomplete information on both sides and no depreciation between two identical players. We characterise the essentially unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium of this game which turns out to be in gradually increasing offers.

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Year of publication:	2006-06
Authors:	Schweinzer, Paul
Institutions:	Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
Subject:	Gradual bargaining \| Common values \| Incomplete information \| Repeated games

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Classification:	C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; D44 - Auctions ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; J12 - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005739683