Sequential decisions in the Diamond-Dybvig banking model

Markus Kinateder; Hubert János Kiss

We study the Diamond-Dybvig model of financial intermediation (JPE, 1983) under the assumption that depositors have information about previous decisions. Depositors decide sequentially whether to withdraw their funds or continue holding them in the bank. If depositors observe the history of all previous decisions, we show that there are no bank runs in equilibrium independently of whether the realized type vector selected by nature is of perfect or imperfect information.

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Year of publication:	2013
Authors:	Kinateder, Markus ; Kiss, Hubert János
Publisher:	Budapest : Institute of Economics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences
Subject:	Bank Run \| Imperfect Information \| Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium \| Bankenkrise \| Banking crisis \| Unvollkommene Information \| Incomplete information \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Asymmetrische Information \| Asymmetric information \| Einlagensicherung \| Deposit insurance \| Bankenliquidität \| Bank liquidity

Extent:	Online-Ressource (41 S.)
Series:	Mu̐helytanulmányok / Magyar Tudományos Akadémia, Közgazdaságtudományi Intézet. - Budapest : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ISSN 1785-377X, ZDB-ID 2276849-X. - Vol. 2013/45
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper ; Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature
Language:	English
Notes:	Zsfassung in ungar. Sprache Systemvoraussetzungen: Acrobat Reader Parallelsacht.: Szekvenciális döntések a Diamond-Dybvigbankmodellben
ISBN:	978-615-5447-06-8
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/108328 [Handle]
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; G21 - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Mortgages
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010222327