Sequential, multidimensional screening : conference paper

Litterscheid, Sina; Szalay, Dezsö

We study a sequential screening problem where the agent produces an object consisting of multiple items and has a multidimensional type that he learns over time. Depending on the strength of complementarity/substitutability of the items, the optimal allocation features a different pattern of distortions. For mild complements or substitutes, a simple solution procedure picks up the optimum.

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Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	Litterscheid, Sina ; Szalay, Dezső
Published in:	Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2014: Evidenzbasierte Wirtschaftspolitik Session: Contract theory ; V3
Publisher:	[Kiel : ZBW
Subject:	Leistungsbündel \| Bundling strategy \| Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie \| Agency theory \| Produktionskosten \| Production costs \| Asymmetrische Information \| Asymmetric information \| Signalling

Extent:	Online-Ressource (56 S.) graph. Darst.
Conferences:	Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik: Evidenzbasierte Wirtschaftspolitik ; 2014
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Konferenzschrift ; Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature
Language:	English
Notes:	Systemvoraussetzungen: Acrobat Reader
Other identifiers:	hdl:10419/100621 [Handle]
Classification:	D80 - Information and Uncertainty. General ; D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10010491117