Sequential, multidimensional screening

We study a sequential screening problem where the agent produces an object consisting of multiple items and has a multidimensional type that he learns over time. Depending on the strength of complementarity/substitutability of the items, the optimal allocation features a different pattern of distortions. For mild complements or substitutes, a simple solution procedure picks up the optimum.

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Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	Litterscheid, Sina ; Szalay, Dezsö
Publisher:	Kiel und Hamburg : ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft

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Series:	Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2014: Evidenzbasierte Wirtschaftspolitik - Session: Contract Theory ; A12-V3
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Conference Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	820203920 [GVK] hdl:10419/100621 [Handle] RePEc:zbw:vfsc14:100621 [RePEc]
Classification:	D80 - Information and Uncertainty. General ; D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010396799