Sequential, multidimensional screening

We study a sequential screening problem where the agent produces an object consisting of multiple items and has a multidimensional type that he learns over time. Depending on the strength of complementarity/substitutability of the items, the optimal allocation features a different pattern of distortions. For mild complements or substitutes, a simple solution procedure picks up the optimum.

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Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	Litterscheid, Sina ; Szalay, Dezsö
Institutions:	Verein für Socialpolitik - VfS

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Classification:	D80 - Information and Uncertainty. General ; D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011164175