Sequential versus Bundle Auctions for Recurring Procurement

We compare sequential and bundle procurement auctions in a framework of successive procurement situations, where current success positively or negatively affects future market opportunities. We find that in bundle auctions procurement cost is lower and less risky than in sequential standard auctions, but still higher than in the optimal sequential auction. Only a sequential second price auction leads to the efficient outcome.

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Year of publication:	2006-06-06
Authors:	Grimm, Veronika
Institutions:	Staatswissenschaftliches Seminar, Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät
Subject:	Sequential auctions \| bundling \| stochastic scale effects \| procurement

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Working Paper Series in Economics.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Number 27
Classification:	D44 - Auctions ; H57 - Procurement ; D92 - Intertemporal Firm Choice and Growth, Investment, or Financing
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005824139