Setting lower bounds on truthfulness
Ahuva Mu'alem, Michael Schapira
| Year of publication: |
2018
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Mu̕alem, Ahuva ; Schapira, Michael |
| Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 110.2018, p. 174-193
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| Subject: | Algorithmic Mechanism Design | Bayesian Incentive-Compatible mechanisms | Randomized truthful mechanisms | Scheduling | Truthfulness-in-expectation mechanisms | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Scheduling-Verfahren | Scheduling problem | Algorithmus | Algorithm | Bayes-Statistik | Bayesian inference | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1016/j.geb.2018.02.001 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012052087