Shareholders and managers as principal-agent hierarchies and cooperative teams
Year of publication: |
2017
|
---|---|
Authors: | Kiefer, Matthias ; Jones, Edward A. E. ; Adams, Andrew |
Published in: |
Qualitative research in financial markets. - Bingley [u.a.] : Emerald, ISSN 1755-4179, ZDB-ID 2473943-1. - Vol. 9.2017, 1, p. 48-71
|
Subject: | Agency theory | Corporate governance | M & A | Executive compensation | Contracting theory | Share options policy | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Corporate Governance | Führungskräfte | Managers | Managervergütung | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Hierarchie | Hierarchy | Aktionäre | Shareholders | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Arbeitsgruppe | Team | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay |
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