Sharing the surplus in games with externalities within and across issues

We consider environments in which agents can cooperate on multiple issues and externalities are present both within and across issues. We propose a way to extend (Shapley) values that have been put forward to deal with externalities within issues to games where there are externalities within and across issues. We characterize our proposal through axioms that extend the Shapley axioms to our more general environment.

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Year of publication:	2011-08-01
Authors:	Diamantoudi, Effrosyni ; Macho-Stadler, Inés ; Pérez-Castrillo, David ; Xue, Licun
Institutions:	Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
Subject:	externalities \| cooperative game theory \| Shapley value \| linked issues

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	UFAE and IAE Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	3 pages long
Classification:	C71 - Cooperative Games ; D62 - Externalities
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009278197