Shotgun Mechanisms for Common-Value Partnerships: The Unassigned-Offeror Problem

Shotguns clauses are commonly included in the business agreements of partnerships and limited liability companies (LLCs), but the role of o fferor typically remains unassigned. In a common-value, one-sided asymmetric information setting, unfair and ineffcient outcomes occur with an unassigned o fferor. Experimental results are aligned with our theory.

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Year of publication:	2013-07-01
Authors:	Landeo, Claudia M. ; Spier, Kathryn
Institutions:	Department of Economics, University of Alberta
Subject:	Business Deadlock \| Shotgun Mechanisms \| Asymmetric Information \| Experiments

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	The text is part of a series Working Papers Number 2013-10 29 pages
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C90 - Design of Experiments. General ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; K40 - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior. General
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011266408