Shotgun mechanisms for common-value partnerships: The unassigned-offeror problem

Shotgun clauses are commonly included in the business agreements of partnerships and limited liability companies (LLCs), but the role of offeror typically remains unassigned. In a common-value, one-sided asymmetric information setting, unequal and inefficient outcomes occur with an unassigned offeror. Experimental results are aligned with our theory.

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Year of publication:	2013
Authors:	Landeo, Claudia M. ; Spier, Kathryn E.
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 121.2013, 3, p. 390-394
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Business deadlock \| Shotgun mechanisms \| Asymmetric information \| Experiments

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	K40 - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior. General ; C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C90 - Design of Experiments. General ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

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