Side-communication yields efficiency of ascending auctions: The two-items case

We analyze a simultaneous ascending auction with anonymous item prices, for two items that are substitutes. This popular format entails increased opportunities for coordination among bidders, since bids are observable and can be used as signaling. This has happened, e.g., in the Netherlands 3G Telecom Auction and in the FCC auctions.

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Year of publication:	2012
Authors:	Lavi, Ron ; Oren, Sigal
Published in:	Games and Economic Behavior. - Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256. - Vol. 76.2012, 2, p. 439-456
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Simultaneous ascending auctions \| Myopic bidding \| Signaling \| Ex-post efficiency

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	C70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. General ; D44 - Auctions ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10010588264