Signal-Jamming in a Sequential Auction

In a recurring auction early bids may reveal biddersâ€™ types, which in turn affects bidding in later auctions. Bidders take this into account and may bid in a way that conceals their private information until the last auction is played. The present paper analyzes the equilibrium of a sequence of ?rst-price auctions assuming bidders have stable private values. We show that signal-jamming occurs and explore the dynamics of equilibrium prices.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2009-06
Authors:	Ding, Wei ; Jeitschko, Thomas D. ; Wolfstetter, Elmar G.
Institutions:	Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
Subject:	Auctions \| Signaling \| Price Competition

freely available

Full text |

More access options

Check Google Scholar

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

More details

Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004980377