Signal jamming in a sequential auction

In a sequence of first-price auctions with stable private values bidders strategically conceal their private information until the last auction. We characterize equilibrium bidding and explore how such signal jamming affects the dynamics of equilibrium prices.

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Year of publication:	2010
Authors:	Ding, Wei ; Jeitschko, Thomas D. ; Wolfstetter, Elmar G.
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 108.2010, 1, p. 58-61
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Auctions Signaling Price competition

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Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008494857