Signal Jamming in a Sequential Auction

In a recurring auction early bids may reveal bidders' types, which in turn affects bidding in later auctions. Bidders take this into account and may bid in a way that conceals their private information until the last auction is played. The present paper analyzes the equilibrium of a sequence of first-price auctions assuming bidders have stable private values. We show that signal-jamming occurs and explore the dynamics of equilibrium prices

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Year of publication:	2010
Authors:	Ding, Wei
Other Persons:	Jeitschko, Thomas D. (contributor) ; Wolfstetter, Elmar (contributor)
Publisher:	[2010]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Auktionstheorie \| Auction theory \| Signalling \| Extensives Spiel \| Extensive form game \| Preiswettbewerb \| Price competition \| Dynamisches Gleichgewicht \| Dynamic equilibrium
Description of contents:	Abstract [papers.ssrn.com]

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	In: Economics Letters, Vol. 108, No. 1, 2010 Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments May 19, 2010 erstellt Volltext nicht verfügbar
Classification:	D44 - Auctions ; D02 - Institutions: Design, Formation, and Operations ; D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

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