Signaling Commitment by Excessive Spending
Year of publication: |
2008-02
|
---|---|
Authors: | Glazer, Amihai ; Proost, Stef |
Institutions: | Department of Economics, University of California-Irvine |
Subject: | Government spending | Signaling | Commitment |
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