Simultaneous Ascending Auctions With Common Complementarities

Competitive equilibria are shown to exist in two-object exchange economies with indivisibilities and additive complementarities in agent valuations between objects, provided that complementarities are common across agents. We further investigate whether the competitive equilibrium can be obtained as an outcome of a simultaneous English-type auction mechanism under non-strategic (honest) bidding.

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Year of publication:	2002
Authors:	Sherstyuk, Katerina
Institutions:	Department of Economics, University of Hawaii-Manoa
Subject:	competitive equilibrium \| complementarities \| auctions

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Number 200212 21 pages
Classification:	C62 - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium ; D44 - Auctions ; D51 - Exchange and Production Economies
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005704422