Simultaneous auctions without complements are (almost) efficient
Michal Feldman, Hu Fu, Nick Gravin, Brendan Lucier
| Year of publication: |
2020
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|---|---|
| Authors: | Feldman, Michal ; Fu, Hu ; Gravin, Nikolai ; Lucier, Brendan |
| Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 123.2020, p. 327-341
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| Subject: | Allocative efficiency | Auctions | Cost-benefit analysis noncooperative games | asymmetric and private information | Mechanism design | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Allokationseffizienz | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Kosten-Nutzen-Analyse | Cost-benefit analysis | Spieltheorie | Game theory |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1016/j.geb.2015.11.009 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012430766