Sincere and Strategic Voters in a Model of Proportional Representation.

In this paper we analyze a model of proportional representation that allows for both sincere and strategic voting. We prove that strategic voters vote only for the extreme parties in any equilibrium,if the electorate is large.

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Year of publication:	2001
Authors:	De Sinopoli, F. ; Iannantuoni, G.
Institutions:	Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), École des Sciences Économiques de Louvain
Subject:	MODEL \| VOTING \| BEHAVIOUR

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Series:	Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	11 pages
Classification:	D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005779455