Single versus multiple randomization in matching mechanisms
Year of publication: |
2017
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---|---|
Authors: | Schmelzer, André |
Published in: |
Essays on market design and regulation under bounded rationality. - Berlin. - 2017, p. 1-30
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Subject: | market design | school choice | mechanism design | experiment | deferred acceptance algorithm | randomization | tie-breaking | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Schulauswahl | School choice | Matching | Experiment | Marktmechanismus | Market mechanism | Algorithmus | Algorithm |
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