Size monotonicity and stability of the core in hedonic games

We show that the core of each strongly size monotonic hedonic game is not empty and is externally stable. This is in sharp contrast to other sufficient conditions for core non-emptiness which do not even guarantee the existence of a stable set in such games.

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Year of publication:	2011
Authors:	Dimitrov, Dinko ; Sung, Shao Chin
Publisher:	Milano : Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
Subject:	Core \| Hedonic Games \| Monotonicity \| Stable Sets

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Series:	Nota di Lavoro ; 52.2011
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	664548083 [GVK] hdl:10419/53272 [Handle]
Classification:	C71 - Cooperative Games
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010279500