Social choice, the strong Pareto principle, and conditional decisiveness

This paper examines social choice theory with the strong Pareto principle. The notion of conditional decisiveness is introduced to clarify the underlying power structure behind strongly Paretian aggregation rules satisfying binary independence. We discuss the various degrees of social rationality: transitivity, semi-transitivity, the interval-order property, quasi-transitivity, and acyclicity. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013

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Year of publication:	2013
Authors:	Cato, Susumu
Published in:	Theory and Decision. - Springer. - Vol. 75.2013, 4, p. 563-579
Publisher:	Springer
Subject:	Arrow’s impossibility theorem \| Strong Pareto \| Ultrafilter \| Conditional decisiveness \| Serial dictatorship

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Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

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