Social insurance and taxation under sequential majority voting and utilitarian regimes
Year of publication: |
1995
|
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Authors: | Aiyagari, Sudhakar Rao |
Other Persons: | Peled, Dan (contributor) |
Published in: |
Journal of economic dynamics & control. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1889, ZDB-ID 717409-3. - Vol. 19.1995, 8, p. 1511-1528
|
Subject: | Umverteilung | Redistribution | Sozialversicherung | Social insurance | Steuerpolitik | Tax policy | Sparen | Savings | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Ökonomische Theorie der Demokratie | Economic theory of democracy | Theorie | Theory |
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