Social welfare functions that satisfy pareto, anonymity, and neutrality, but not independence of irrelevant alternatives
Donald E. Campbell; Jerry S. Kelly
| Year of publication: |
2007
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|---|---|
| Authors: | Campbell, Donald E. ; Kelly, Jerry S. |
| Published in: |
Social choice and welfare. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 0176-1714, ZDB-ID 855101-7. - Vol. 29.2007, 1, p. 69-82
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| Subject: | Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion | Social welfare function | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Unmöglichkeitstheorem | Impossibility theorem | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Theorie | Theory |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003472833