Socially optimal Nash equilibrium locations and privatization in a model of spatial duopoly with price discrimination

We generalize Beladi et al. (2014) for any non-negative, increasing, continuous function of distance as transportation costs function. By doing so, we show that in a duopoly, partial privatization does not change the socially optimal character of the Nash equilibrium location. Our results call for further research on testing their robustness under the existence of more than two competing firms.

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Year of publication:	2015-04-12
Authors:	Eleftheriou, Konstantinos ; Michelacakis, Nickolas
Institutions:	Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
Subject:	Privatization \| Spatial competition \| Transportation costs

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	MPRA Paper.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Classification:	L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; L32 - Public Enterprises ; R32 - Other Spatial Production and Pricing Analysis
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011266241