Socially Optimal Royalty Design and Illegal Logging under Alternative Penalty Schemes
Year of publication: |
2004
|
---|---|
Authors: | Amacher, Gregory S. ; Koskela, Erkki ; Ollikainen, Markku |
Institutions: | CESifo |
Subject: | illegal logging | royalty design | penalty schemes |
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Socially Optimal Royalty Design and Illegal Logging under Alternative Penalty Schemes
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