Socially Optimal Royalty Design and Illegal Logging under Alternative Penalty Schemes
Year of publication: |
2004
|
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Authors: | Amacher, Gregory S. ; Koskela, Erkki ; Ollikainen, Markku |
Publisher: |
Munich : Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |
Subject: | illegal logging | royalty design | penalty schemes |
Series: | CESifo Working Paper ; 1131 |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 843967811 [GVK] hdl:10419/76549 [Handle] RePec:ces:ceswps:_1131 [RePEc] |
Source: |
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Socially Optimal Royalty Design and Illegal Logging under Alternative Penalty Schemes
Amacher, Gregory S., (2004)
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Socially optimal royalty design and illegal logging under alternative penalty schemes
Amacher, Gregory S., (2004)
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