Soft budget constraints and ownership: Empirical evidence from US hospitals
Consistent with the property rights theory of ownership incorporating soft budget constraints (SBCs), we find that controlling for SBCs, for-profit hospitals drop safety-net services more often and exhibit higher mortality rates, suggesting aggressive cost control that damages non-contractible quality.
Year of publication: |
2011
|
---|---|
Authors: | Eggleston, Karen ; Shen, Yu-Chu |
Published in: |
Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 110.2011, 1, p. 7-11
|
Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Keywords: | Soft budget constraints Ownership Health care For-profit Hospital quality |
Saved in:
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
The effect of soft budget constraints on access and quality in hospital care
Shen, Yu-Chu, (2009)
-
Soft budget constraints in China: Evidence from the Guangdong hospital industry
Eggleston, Karen, (2009)
-
Hospital ownership and quality of care: what explains the different results in the literature?
Eggleston, Karen, (2008)
- More ...