Softening Competition by Enhancing Entry : An Example from the Banking Industry

We show that competing firms relax overall competition by lowering future barriers to entry. We illustrate our findings in a two-period model with adverse selection where banks strategically commit to disclose borrower information. By doing this, they invite rivals to enter their market. Disclosure of borrower information increases an entrant's second-period profits. This dampens competition for serving the first-period market

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Year of publication:	[2013]
Authors:	Bouckaert, Jan
Other Persons:	Degryse, Hans (contributor)
Publisher:	[2013]: [S.l.] : SSRN

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (35 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments October 2002 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.346341 [DOI]
Classification:	D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; G21 - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Mortgages
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012754661