Solvable States in n-player Stochastic Games

We prove that, in every stochastic game with finitely many states and actions, there exists at least one state, starting from which an equilibrium payoff exists. This is achieved by proving that there exists a solvable set. This generalizes to an arbitrary number of players a result due to Thuijsman and Vrieze in the case of two players.

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Year of publication:	2000
Authors:	Vieille, Nicolas
Institutions:	Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX)
Subject:	stochastic games \| nonzero-sum games \| equilibrium payoff

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Series:	Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Published in SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization, 2000, Vol. 38, no. 6. pp. 1794-1804.Length: 10 pages
Classification:	C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010707414