Solving a hold-up problem may harm all firms : downstream R&D and transport-price contracts
Year of publication: |
2019
|
---|---|
Authors: | Takauchi, Kazuhiro ; Mizuno, Tomomichi |
Published in: |
International review of economics & finance : IREF. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 1059-0560, ZDB-ID 1137476-7. - Vol. 59.2019, p. 29-49
|
Subject: | Downstream R&D | Firm-specific Carrier | Hold-up problem | Transport-price contracts | Unvollständiger Vertrag | Incomplete contract | Vertrag | Contract | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Vertikale Integration | Vertical integration | Lieferantenmanagement | Supplier relationship management | Sunk Costs | Sunk costs | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Investition | Investment | Investitionsentscheidung | Investment decision |
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