Some chance for consensus : voting methods for which consensus is an equilibrium
Year of publication: |
2012
|
---|---|
Authors: | Heitzig, Jobst ; Simmons, Forest W. |
Published in: |
Social choice and welfare. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 0176-1714, ZDB-ID 855101-7. - Vol. 38.2012, 1, p. 43-57
|
Subject: | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Theorie | Theory |
-
Saari, Donald, (2000)
-
The majoritarian compromise is majoritarian-optimal and subgame-perfect implementable
Sertel, Murat R., (1999)
-
Indirect voting systems : Banzhaf numbers, majority funtions and collective competence
Berg, Sven, (1997)
- More ...
-
Some chance for consensus: voting methods for which consensus is an equilibrium
Heitzig, Jobst, (2011)
-
Fair and efficient collective decisions via nondeterministic proportional consensus
Heitzig, Jobst, (2021)
-
Fair group decisions via non-deterministic proportional consensus
Heitzig, Jobst, (2025)
- More ...