Some equivalence results between mixed strategy Nash equilibria and minimax regret in 2x2 games

We show that in any 2x2 game in which a unique mixed strategy Nash equilibrium exists, the probability distribution that this equilibrium assigns to player i is either the same or the mirror image of the distribution that the minimax regret criterion defines for player j. Sharper results that connect the two distributions for the same player are then established for the class of symmetric games.

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Year of publication:	2007-07-06
Authors:	Gallice, Andrea
Published in:	Economics Bulletin. - AccessEcon, ISSN 1545-2921. - Vol. 3.2007, 29, p. 1-8
Publisher:	AccessEcon

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory ; D8 - Information and Uncertainty
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010629838