Some Inequalities related to the analysis of electricity auctions

Most balaning markets of electric power are organized as uniform-price auctions. In 2001, the balancing market of England and Wales switched to a pay-as-bid auction with the intention of reducing wholesale electricity prices. Numerical simultations of an electricity auction model have indicated that this should lead to decreased average prices. In this article we prove two inequalities which give an analytic proof of this claim in the same model.

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Year of publication:	2005
Authors:	Hästö, Peter ; Holmberg, Pär
Publisher:	Uppsala : Uppsala University, Department of Economics
Subject:	Elektrizität \| Auktion \| Oligopol \| Kapazitätsauslastung \| Theorie \| supply function equilibrium \| uniform-price auction \| pay-as-bid auctions \| discriminatory auction \| oligopoly \| capacity constraint \| wholesale electricity markets \| inequalities

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Series:	Working Paper ; 2005:23
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	504006029 [GVK] hdl:10419/82685 [Handle] RePEc:hhs:uunewp:2005_023 [RePEc]
Classification:	C62 - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium ; D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; D44 - Auctions ; L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure Size; Size Distribution of Firms ; L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; L94 - Electric Utilities
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010321551