Some Inequalities related to the analysis of electricity auctions

Most balaning markets of electric power are organized as uniform-price auctions. In 2001, the balancing market of England and Wales switched to a pay-as-bid auction with the intention of reducing wholesale electricity prices. Numerical simultations of an electricity auction model have indicated that this should lead to decreased average prices. In this article we prove two inequalities which give an analytic proof of this claim in the same model.

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Year of publication:	2005-08-26
Authors:	Hästö, Peter ; Holmberg, Pär
Institutions:	Nationalekonomiska Institutionen, Uppsala Universitet
Subject:	supply function equilibrium \| uniform-price auction \| pay-as-bid auctions \| discriminatory auction \| oligopoly \| capacity constraint \| wholesale electricity markets \| inequalities

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Working Paper Series.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Published in Applied Mathematics Letters, 2006, pages 814-819. The text is part of a series Working Paper Series Number 2005:23 7 pages
Classification:	C62 - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium ; D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; D44 - Auctions ; L11 - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure Size; Size Distribution of Firms ; L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; L94 - Electric Utilities
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005644593