Sorting the good guys from bad : on the optimal audit structure with ex-ante information acquisition
Year of publication: |
2014
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Authors: | Menichini, Anna Maria ; Simmons, Peter J. |
Published in: |
Economic theory : official journal of the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 0938-2259, ZDB-ID 1059110-2. - Vol. 57.2014, 2, p. 339-376
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Subject: | Contracts | Auditing | Ex-ante information | Debt contract | Wirtschaftsprüfung | Financial audit | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Vertrag | Contract | Informationsversorgung | Information provision |
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