Sound Belief-Shaping Rules that Make all Equilibria Strategically Unstable.
Year of publication: |
1996
|
---|---|
Authors: | Arana, A-Q |
Institutions: | Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona |
Subject: | ECONOMIC MODELS | GAMES |
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