Sovereign default restructuring options and challenges in the European Monetary Union (EMU)

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to discuss and evaluate the sovereign default restructuring options in the European Monetary Union (EMU). Design/methodology/approach – The paper examines financial policy options from a politico‐economic‐legal perspective. It relies primarily on secondary data analysis. Findings – Sovereign default restructuring an unthinkable phenomenon in the hitherto affluent EMU could now be a possibility because of the lack of political cohesion and the realities of two‐speed European Union. Research limitations/implications – The paper relies extensively on secondary data. Future research through empirical multiple case studies would enrich the insights of this paper. Practical implications – Insights from the paper would be of benefit to lawmakers, financial supervisors, financial institutions and investors in general. Originality/value – The paper's main value lies in its use of multiple lenses to evaluate a serious financial issue in the EMU.