Specialist vs. Generalist : Efficiency in Multitasking

We show that under multitasking - where tasks can be substitutes or complements - a specialist worker with an uneven skill distribution can outperform a generalist with higher average skills. We use a principal-agent model to study worker efficiency and welfare. The main result is robust if a rent-efficiency trade-off is added

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Year of publication:	[2021]
Authors:	Buchen, Clemens ; Kragl, Jenny ; Palermo, Alberto
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Effizienz \| Efficiency \| Theorie \| Theory \| Technische Effizienz \| Technical efficiency \| Effizienzmarkthypothese \| Efficient market hypothesis

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (10 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments October 22, 2020 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.3716998 [DOI]
Classification:	D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory ; M12 - Personnel Management ; M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects (stock options, fringe benefits, incentives, family support programs) ; M54 - Labor Management (team formation, worker empowerment, job design, tasks and authority, job satisfaction)
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013249533