Stable matching in large markets with occupational choice

Guilherme Carmona, Krittanai Laohakunakorn

We introduce a model of large many-to-one matching markets with occupational choice where each individual can choose which side of the market to belong to. We show that stable matchings exist under mild assumptions; in particular, both complementarities and externalities can be accommodated. Our model generalizes Greinecker and Kah (2021), which focuses on one-to-one matching and did not allow for occupational choice. Applications include the roommate problem with non-atomic participants, explaining the size and distribution of firms and wage inequality.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2024
Authors:	Carmona, Guilherme ; Krittanai Laohakunakorn
Published in:	Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in economic theory. - Toronto : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ISSN 1555-7561, ZDB-ID 2220447-7. - Vol. 19.2024, 3, p. 1261-1304
Subject:	ccupational choice \| stability \| complementarity \| externalities \| large economy \| Theorie \| Theory \| Berufswahl \| Occupational choice \| Matching \| Externer Effekt \| Externalities

freely available

Full text |

More access options

doi.org

Check Google Scholar

In libraries world-wide (WorldCat)

In German libraries (KVK)

subito order

I need help

Type of publication:	Article
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.3982/TE5915 [DOI]
Classification:	C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; d47
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014635431