Stable pricing in monopoly and equilibrium-core of cost games

We prove the existence of subsidy free and sustainable pricing schedule in multiproduct contestable markets. We allow firms to discriminate the local markets that are composed by a set of the products line and a set of agents. Results are obtained under an assumption of fair sharing cost and under boundary condition of demand functions. The pricing problem is modelled in terms of equilibrium-core allocations of parameterized cost games.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2004-10
Authors:	Iehlé, Vincent
Institutions:	HAL
Subject:	Cooperative games \| contestable markets \| sustainability \| subsidy free \| parameterized cost games

freely available

Full text |

More access options

Check Google Scholar

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

More details

Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Post-Print.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00193961
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010750745