Stable Provision vs. Cournot-Nash Equilibria in Pure Public Good Economies.

Shitovitz and Spiegel (1998) demonstrated that in pure public good economies, for some consumers the Lindahl consumption bundles can be inferior (utility-wise) to their Cournot-Nash allocation. In this paper, we prove that in any finite pure public good economy there exists a core allocation that is unanimously preferred, utility-wise, by all consumers over their Cournot-Nash consumption bundles. Copyright 2001 by Blackwell Publishing Inc.

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Year of publication:	2001
Authors:	Shitovitz, Benyamin ; Spiegel, Menahem
Published in:	Journal of Public Economic Theory. - Association for Public Economic Theory - APET, ISSN 1097-3923. - Vol. 3.2001, 2, p. 219-24
Publisher:	Association for Public Economic Theory - APET

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Extent:	text/html
Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

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