Stackelberg problems with followers in the grand coalition of a Tu-game

In this article, a case of partial cooperation in a game theory framework is studied. The interest is on a bi-level Stackelberg problem where one of the players is the leader and the rest are the followers, involved in a TU-game. The continuity, with respect to the leader’s choice, of the Shapley value function and the core correspondence of the TU-game is investigated. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2013

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Year of publication:	2013
Authors:	Pensavalle, C. ; Pieri, G.
Published in:	Decisions in Economics and Finance. - Springer, ISSN 1593-8883. - Vol. 36.2013, 1, p. 89-98
Publisher:	Springer
Subject:	Stakelberg equilibrium \| Leader–follower \| TU-games \| Core \| Shapley value \| Primary C70: Game Theory and Bargaining Theory \| Secondary C71: Cooperative Game

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Extent:	text/html
Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

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