Stagnation proofness in n-agent bargaining problems
Year of publication: |
2019
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Authors: | García-Segarra, Jaume ; Ginés-Vilar, Miguel |
Published in: |
Journal of economic interaction and coordination : JEIC. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 1860-711X, ZDB-ID 2239073-X. - Vol. 14.2019, 1, p. 215-224
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Subject: | Bargaining | Monotonicity | Pareto optimality | Stagnation | Verhandlungstheorie | Bargaining theory | Pareto-Optimum | Pareto efficiency | Verhandlungen | Negotiations | Wohlfahrtsökonomik | Welfare economics |
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