Standards vs. labels with imperfect competition and asymmetric information

I demonstrate that providing information about product quality is not necessarily the best way to address asymmetric information problems when markets are imperfectly competitive. In a vertical dierentiation model I show that a Minimum Quality Standard, which retains asymmetric information, generates more welfare than a label, which provides full information.

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Year of publication:	2011-01
Authors:	Baltzer, Kenneth
Institutions:	Institut for Fødevare- og Ressourceøkonomi, Københavns Universitet
Subject:	minimum quality standard \| label \| asymmetric information \| vertical differentiation \| product quality

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	IFRO Working Paper.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Number 2011/1 22 pages
Classification:	L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; L15 - Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility ; L51 - Economics of Regulation
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009147454