State Infrastructural Power and Social Transfers : The Local Politics of Distribution and Delivering ‘Progress’ in Ethiopia

This paper examines the politics of implementing the PSNP in Ethiopia. The PSNP isa targeted food and cash-for-work programme that places a strong emphasis on its‘productive’ contribution through public works, a livelihoods component and the aim ofmass ‘graduation’ from support. The paper focuses on how local governments resolvetwo challenges related to the distribution of social transfers. First, is the challenge forstate capacity of generating sufficient and accurate information with which to selecthouseholds while limiting undue influence of powerful local actors. Second, is therecurrent tension between the programme’s developmental objectives and itsprotective function. The paper argues that variation in state infrastructural power is vitalto understanding how these challenges are resolved in different parts of Ethiopia.Drawing on two research sites in each of Afar, Oromiya and Tigray, the paperhighlights the extremes of variation within Ethiopia. Implementation is shaped by theparticular spatial pattern of expansion of the party-state carried out under EPRDF rule.In Tigray, strong party-state infrastructural power underpins selection processes andlocal state compliance with national targets. In Oromiya, state infrastructural powerwas underpinned by a significant degree of coercion in the face of limited legitimacy ofthe party-state. However, recent political events have seriously eroded this. In Afar,the state is forced to compensate for its own limitations by engaging in negotiation withclan structures