State Trading and Tariff Rate Quotas: The Case of Korea's Rice Imports

This paper analyzes the effects of trade liberalization of tariff-rate quotas under import "state trading enterprises" (STEs) in agriculture. An analytical framework is provided to determine the importance of which instrument is binding under competition (the in-quota or out-of-quota tariff or the quota) and under the initial STE equilibrium. It also depends on whether or not the STE controls both the domestic market prices and owns/controls the import quota (and whether it is obligated to fill the quota or not). An empirical example of the rice STE in South Korea has simulations showing that an increase in imports can be achieved through a moderate expansion of the quota or a decrease in the out-of-quota tariff to the level where it becomes binding. However, a significant level of quota expansion induces the STE to switch to the autarky solution and social welfare declines. Copyright © 2006 The Authors; Journal compilation © 2006 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.