Statistical Inference as a Bargaining Game

This paper extends the analogy previously established by Leamer (1978a), between a Bayesian inference problem and an economics allocation problem, and shows that posterior modes can be interpreted as optimal outcomes of a bargaining game. This bargaining game, over a parameter value, is played between two players: the researcher, with preferences represented by the prior, and the data, with preferences represented by the likelihood.

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Year of publication:	2001-10-05
Authors:	Ley, Eduardo
Institutions:	EconWPA
Subject:	Social Welfare Function \| Social Information Function \| Contract Curve \| Nash bargaining solution \| Bayesian Inference \| Posterior Mode

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Econometrics.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Forthcoming in Economics Letters.
Classification:	C11 - Bayesian Analysis ; C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005119185