Stealth compensation : do CEOs increase their pay by influencing dividend policy?
Kristina Minnick; Leonard Rosenthal
| Year of publication: |
2014
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Minnick, Kristina ; Rosenthal, Leonard |
| Published in: |
The journal of corporate finance : contracting, governance and organization. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0929-1199, ZDB-ID 1189269-9. - Vol. 25.2014, p. 435-454
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| Subject: | Executive compensation | Payout policy | Firm performance | Corporate governance | Managervergütung | Führungskräfte | Managers | Dividende | Dividend | Corporate Governance | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Vergütungssystem | Compensation system | Unternehmenserfolg | Ausschüttungspolitik | Eigentümerstruktur | Ownership structure | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Aktienoption | Stock option | Aktiengesellschaft | Listed company | Lohn | Wages |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010366927